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I. INTRODUCTION 
In a succinct 1989 opinion, the Minnesota Court of Appeals 
decided Padco, Inc. v. Kinney & Lange, addressing claims for legal 
malpractice and breach of fiduciary duty.1  In the years since, Padco 
has been cited several times for its treatment of the fiduciary duty 
claim.  Indeed, it has become a leading case for the Minnesota 
Court of Appeals when discussing the essential elements of a 
breach of fiduciary duty claim.2  Practitioners, state and federal 
 
       †  The author earned his J.D. with distinction from the University of Iowa 
College of Law in 2008, where he was a member of the Pro Bono Society and a 
Managing Editor of the Journal of Gender, Race & Justice.  He formerly clerked for 
Judge Kevin G. Ross at the Minnesota Court of Appeals, and for Judge Charles A. 
Porter, Jr., in Minnesota’s Fourth Judicial District.  He is currently an associate at 
A•S•K Financial in Eagan, Minnesota.  As a former court of appeals clerk, the 
author has deep respect and admiration for the hardworking judges, clerks, and 
staff of the Minnesota Court of Appeals.  The author thanks his wife Virginia and 
former appellate co-clerk Kristopher (Tip) Lee for their editorial input. 
 1. 444 N.W.2d 889 (Minn. Ct. App. 1989). 
 2. On April 26, 2010, a search of Westlaw’s Minnesota statewide cases 
database for “‘fiduciary duty’ /s element!” returned twenty-one results.  Seventeen 
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district courts, and the Minnesota Court of Appeals have all relied 
upon Padco for what it purportedly states about the elements of a 
breach of fiduciary duty claim.3  But careful scrutiny of Padco itself 
and of other statements of Minnesota’s fiduciary duty law reveal 
that Padco does not say what has been repeatedly attributed to it. 
Padco is often cited to support the proposition that the 
essential elements for a breach of fiduciary duty claim are the same 
as the essential elements for a claim of negligence.4  But Padco does 
not hold or stand for that proposition—the Padco court itself 
recognized otherwise.5  The purpose of this article is to identify and 
highlight the error with the hope that it will not be perpetuated to 
the detriment of future claimants as well as to formulate a more 
accurate statement of the essential elements of a fiduciary duty 
claim under Minnesota law. 
 
were opinions released after Padco.  Five of those cite Padco, and a sixth cites a 
federal district court case that relies on Padco.  See Rucki v. Grazzini, Nos. A09-
0694, A09-0700, A09-1693, 2010 WL 1286725, at *5 (Minn. Ct. App. Apr. 6, 2010) 
(citing Padco, 444 N.W.2d at 891, for the proposition that “the elements of a 
breach-of-fiduciary-duty claim are the same as those of negligence.”); Mesenbrink 
v. Riverwood ENT, LLC, No. A09-334, 2009 WL 3818378, at *3 (Minn. Ct. App. 
Nov. 17, 2009) (citing Padco, 444 N.W.2d at 891, for the proposition that a 
negligence claim has the same elements as a breach of fiduciary duty claim); Tyler 
Holdings, Inc. v. JJT, LLC, No. A07-2046, 2008 WL 5136443, at *8 (Minn. Ct. App. 
Dec. 9, 2008) (citing Padco, 444 N.W.2d at 891, for the idea that a negligence claim 
has the same elements as a breach of fiduciary duty claim); Azbill v. Grande, No. 
A04-2139, 2005 WL 1331718, at *8 (Minn. Ct. App. Aug. 16, 2005) (citing Padco, 
444 N.W.2d at 891, for the idea that a negligence claim has the same elements as a 
breach of fiduciary duty claim); Tisdell v. ValAdCo, Nos. C0-01-2054, C6-01-2060, 
C2-01-2055, C6-01-2057, 2002 WL 31368336, at *13 (Minn. Ct. App. Oct. 16, 2002) 
(citing Conwed Corp. v. Emp’r Reinsurance Corp., 816 F. Supp. 1360, 1362 n.3 
(D. Minn. 1993), which relies on Padco for the proposition that causation is a 
required element for a breach of fiduciary duty claim); Star Centers, Inc. v. Faegre 
& Benson, LLP, No. C0-00-2075, 2001 WL 605088, at *3 (Minn. Ct. App. June 5, 
2001) (citing Padco, 444 N.W.2d at 891, for the proposition that the elements of a 
breach of fiduciary claim are the same as those of a negligence claim).  Each of 
these is an unpublished Minnesota Court of Appeals decision, and all reason 
(expressly or implicitly) that Padco describes the necessary elements of a claim for 
breach of fiduciary duty. 
 3. See, e.g., cases cited supra note 2; Conwed, 816 F. Supp. at 1362 n.3 (citing 
Padco, 444 N.W.2d at 891 for the proposition that the elements required for a 
breach of fiduciary duty claim are the same as those for a negligence claim); see 
also infra notes 8, 61. 
 4. See, e.g., cases cited supra note 2 and infra note 61. 
 5. See infra Part III (arguing that Padco did not hold that the elements of 
both negligence and breach of fiduciary duty are the same and explaining the 
confusion). 
2
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II. COURTS AND LITIGANTS ERRONEOUSLY RELY ON PADCO 
WHEN DISCUSSING THE ESSENTIAL ELEMENTS OF A 
FIDUCIARY DUTY CLAIM 
A string of unpublished court of appeals decisions cited Padco 
for the proposition that “[u]nder Minnesota law, the elements 
required to state a breach-of-fiduciary-duty claim are the same as 
those required to establish a negligence claim.”6  These cases 
reached this conclusion by relying exclusively on an inference 
drawn from Padco without any further discussion or analysis.7  In 
one instance, the errant conclusion was reimported by the court of 
appeals from a published federal case which drew the same 
inference from Padco in the same manner.8  Federal and state trial 
courts have been persuaded to draw the same flawed inference.9 
Concededly, the mistake is not without a certain intellectual 
appeal.  The notion that a legal cause of action requires, as a 
threshold for sufficiency, an allegation of harm to the plaintiff 
caused by the defendant is a familiar aspect of the law of 
negligence.10  It seems to follow naturally to a judicious mind that if 
a plaintiff did not suffer pecuniary or personal harm as a 
consequence of a defendant’s acts, then why should the judicial 
system be involved at all?  The rationale’s appeal is magnified by 
the easy parallels between a fiduciary duty claim and a negligence 
 
 6. Star Centers, 2001 WL 605088, at *3; see also cases cited supra note 2. 
 7. See cases cited supra note 2; see also THE BLUEBOOK: A UNIFORM SYSTEM OF 
CITATION R. 1.2, at 54 (Columbia Law Review Ass’n et al. eds., 19th ed. 2010) 
(providing that the use of “see” citations is used when an authority does not directly 
support a proposition, but supports the proposition by inference). 
 8. Tisdell v. ValAdCo, Nos. C0-01-2054, C6-01-2060, C2-01-2055, C6-01-2057, 
2002 WL 31368336, at *13 (Minn. Ct. App. Oct. 16, 2002) (citing Conwed Corp. v. 
Emp’r Reinsurance Corp., 816 F. Supp. 1360, 1362 n.3 (D. Minn. 1993), a federal 
case that relies exclusively on an inference ostensibly supported by Padco to draw 
the same conclusion). 
 9. See, e.g., Conwed, 816 F. Supp. at 1362 n.3; Findings of Fact, Conclusions of 
Law, and Order for Judgment at 20, Swenson v. Bender, No. 02-C9-06-007901 
(Minn. 10th D. Feb. 22, 2008), as reprinted in Appellant’s Brief  Appendix at 45, 
Swenson v. Bender, 764 N.W.2d 596 (Minn. Ct. App. 2009).  But see Order, Carlson 
v. Lindquist & Vennum, No. 27-CV-09-20302 (Minn. 4th D. Apr. 6, 2010) 
(rejecting the argument that causation or harm are essential elements of a 
fiduciary duty claim). 
 10. State Farm Fire & Cas. v. Aquila, Inc., 718 N.W.2d 879, 887 (Minn. 2006) 
(stating elements of negligence claim); Herrmann v. McMenomy & Severson, 583 
N.W.2d 283, 290 n.8 (Minn. Ct. App. 1998) (noting that Minnesota recognizes the 
common law rule that injury is an essential element of negligence, and impliedly 
recognizing the availability of nominal damages for other claims), rev’d on other 
grounds, Herrmann v. McMenomy & Severson, 590 N.W.2d 641 (Minn. 1999). 
3
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claim: both unmistakably require a claimant to allege duty and 
breach.11 
As it turns out, states are divided on the proper treatment of 
breach of fiduciary duty causes of action.  Some states 
unequivocally perceive the claim in the negligence tort vein and 
require proof of harm and causation.12  But other states conclude 
that breaches of fiduciary duty are inherently harmful and do not 
require plaintiffs to prove harm in order to make a recovery.13  In 
Minnesota, breach of a fiduciary duty is not a form of negligence, 
but a distinct cause of action that sounds in equity.14 
Because the claim sounds in equity, fiduciary beneficiaries may 
pursue a broader range of remedies than may be available to a 
negligence claimant.  A beneficiary may be “entitled to tort 
damages for harm caused by the breach of duty arising from [a 
fiduciary] relation” in accordance with the ordinary tort damages 
rules.15  But  
[i]n addition to or in substitution for [tort] damages the 
beneficiary may be entitled to restitutionary recovery, since not 
only is he entitled to recover for any harm done to his legally 
protected interests . . ., but ordinarily he is entitled to profits 
 
 11. See Aquila, 718 N.W.2d at 887 (stating elements of negligence claim).  But 
see Swenson, 764 N.W.2d at 603–04 (explaining the court’s reluctance to substitute 
breach of fiduciary duty claims for breach of duty under tort claims). 
 12. E.g., Gracey v. Eaker, 837 So.2d 348, 353 (Fla. 2002) (requiring proximate 
causation as an element of breach of fiduciary duty), cited in Thomas L. 
Hafemeister & Richard M. Gulbrandsen, The Fiduciary Obligation of Physicians to 
“Just Say No” if an “Informed” Patient Demands Services That are Not Medically Indicated, 
39 SETON HALL L. REV. 335, 375 n.198 (2009); Miller v. Keybank Nat’l Ass’n, No. 
86327, 2006 WL 871621, at *5 (Ohio Ct. App. Apr. 6, 2006) (requiring proximate 
causation of injury as an element for breach of fiduciary duty); Longaker v. Evans, 
32 S.W.3d 725 (Tex. Ct. App. 2000) (en banc) (requiring proof of damage as an 
element for breach of fiduciary duty).  
 13. Thomas L. Hafemeister & Sarah P. Bryan, Beware Those Bearing Gifts: 
Physicians’ Fiduciary Duty to Avoid Pharmaceutical Marketing, 57 U. KAN. L. REV. 491, 
524 n.195 (2009) (citing Milbank, Tweed, Hadley & McCloy v. Boon, 13 F.3d 537, 
543 (2d Cir. 1994); Zackiva Commc’ns Corp. v. Horowitz, 826 F. Supp. 86, 88 
(S.D.N.Y. 1993); Rice v. Perl, 320 N.W.2d 407, 411 (Minn. 1982); Diamond v. 
Oreamuno, 248 N.E.2d 910, 912 (N.Y. 1969)). 
 14.  Swenson, 764 N.W.2d at 603–04; Commercial Assocs., Inc. v. Work 
Connection, Inc., 712 N.W.2d 772, 778 (Minn. Ct. App. 2006); see RESTATEMENT 
(SECOND) OF TORTS § 874 cmt. b (1979) (“The remedy of a beneficiary against a 
defaulting or negligent trustee is ordinarily in equity . . . .”); see also Hafemeister & 
Bryan, supra note 13, at 524 n.195 (citing Rice, 320 N.W.2d at 411 as an example of 
a decision that causation of harm is not a necessary element of fiduciary duty 
claims). 
 15.  RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 874 cmt. b (1979). 
4
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that result to the fiduciary from his breach of duty . . . .16   
The right of a fiduciary breach claimant to compel disgorgement 
or other noncompensatory remedies irrespective of actual harm 
caused to the claimant by a defendant is well established common 
law.17  Indeed, these remedies are not only well established 
common law, but they are specifically recognized in Minnesota.18 
III. WHAT PADCO DOES AND DOES NOT SAY ABOUT FIDUCIARY 
DUTY CAUSES OF ACTION 
Hennepin County District Court Judge Beryl Nord granted 
summary judgment to defendant David Fairbairn and his law firm 
on November 10, 1988, putting to rest claims related to legal work 
they had done for plaintiff Padco, Inc. in the early 1980s.19  Judge 
Nord’s summary judgment decision was affirmed by the court of 
appeals, and ultimately, the Minnesota Supreme Court denied 
Padco’s petition for further review.20  Padco’s chief complaint was 
that the Kinney & Lange law firm, which represented Padco in a 
federal patent lawsuit, hired two attorneys who had worked for a 
firm that had represented the adverse party in the patent 
litigation.21  Kinney & Lange’s hiring decision led a federal judge to 
disqualify Kinney & Lange from further representing Padco in the 
patent litigation.22 
In its summary judgment decision, the district court 
considered and decided a claim for breach of fiduciary duty.23  The 
court recognized the fiduciary duty claim even though it had not 
 
 16.  Id. 
 17.  See generally RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF RESTITUTION §§ 190–201 (1937) 
(detailing a series of restitutionary remedies available to the beneficiary that do 
not require as a prerequisite harm caused by a fiduciary breach); RESTATEMENT 
(SECOND) OF TORTS § 874 (1979) (explaining, in general, the concepts of fiduciary 
duty, breach, and liability); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY §§ 399–404A (1958) 
(describing forms of liability that may arise against an agent that breaches a 
fiduciary duty). 
 18.  See, e.g., Perl v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 345 N.W.2d 209, 212–13 
(Minn. 1984); Commercial Assocs., 712 N.W.2d at 778–82; Padco, Inc. v. Kinney & 
Lange, 444 N.W.2d 889, 891 (Minn. Ct. App. 1989). 
 19. Order & Memorandum, Padco, Inc. v. Kinney & Lange, No. CT 86-11447 
(Minn. 4th D. Nov. 10, 1988). 
 20. Padco, Inc. v. Kinney & Lange, 444 N.W.2d 889 (Minn. Ct. App. 1985), 
review denied, Nov. 15, 1989.  
 21. Order & Memorandum, supra note 19, at 1. 
 22. Id. 
 23. Id. at 5–6. 
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been expressly identified in the complaint.24  The district court 
concluded that the claim had been sufficiently pled, but ultimately 
determined that the plaintiff had not provided evidence that the 
defendants had breached a fiduciary duty.25 
The district court’s decision to recognize the claim was not 
expressly supported by legal citation, but the court was satisfied 
that the plaintiff had adequate notice of the claim by virtue of the 
complaint’s expressly stated claim for professional negligence.26  
The court reasoned that the claim for attorney malpractice 
incorporated an implicit claim for breach of fiduciary duty, stating: 
“An essential element of any negligence claim is that plaintiff must 
prove that defendant owes him a duty.  It is axiomatic that in an 
attorney malpractice case the duty required is that of a fiduciary 
nature.”27  The court concluded that the claim was sufficiently pled 
on that basis, and proceeded to evaluate whether the plaintiff’s 
evidence could support the conclusion that the defendants 
breached the duty owed to Padco.28  Determining that Padco’s 
evidence was not sufficient on the element of breach, the district 
court granted summary judgment.29 
Padco appealed.30  Its brief on appeal contained extensive 
argument concerning Minnesota’s law of fiduciary duty.31  Padco 
argued that “Minnesota courts conclusively hold that attorneys who 
breach their fiduciary duty to clients forfeit the right to 
compensation” and that “if the attorney breaches his or her 
fiduciary duty to the client, ‘the client is deemed injured even if no 
actual loss results.’”32  Padco argued thoroughly that a claimant who 
had suffered harm from a fiduciary’s breach did not need to prove 
damages, citing three Minnesota Supreme Court decisions in 
support of its argument: Gilchrist v. Perl, 387 N.W.2d 412 (Minn. 
1986), Perl v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Insurance Co., 345 N.W.2d 209 
(Minn. 1984), and Rice v. Perl, 320 N.W.2d 407 (Minn. 1982).33 
 
 24. Id. at 5. 
 25. Id. at 6. 
 26. Id. at 5. 
 27. Id.  
 28. Id. at 5–6. 
 29. Id. at 6. 
 30. Padco, Inc. v. Kinney & Lange, 444 N.W.2d 889 (Minn. Ct. App. 1989). 
 31. Brief of Appellant at 10–12, Padco, 444 N.W.2d 889 (Minn. Ct. App. 1989) 
(No. CT 86-11447). 
 32. Id. at 10 (quoting Perl v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 345 N.W.2d 209, 
212 (Minn. 1984)). 
 33. Id. at 11–12. 
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Kinney & Lange and David Fairbairn (respondents in the 
court of appeals) rejoined, unsurprisingly, that the district court’s 
summary judgment decision was correct.34  They contended that 
Padco “had failed to show any genuine issue of material fact” on its 
breach of fiduciary duty claim, and that the three Perl cases did not 
apply.35  Importantly, for purposes of this article, the respondents 
made an additional argument in a footnote.36  Though there is no 
reason to believe that the respondents could have anticipated its 
effect, this surplus argument is the source of an error courts and 
practitioners in Minnesota have been repeating for years.  The 
footnote reads as follows: 
This theory was never alleged in plaintiff’s Complaint; the 
claim was asserted in this litigation for the first time at the 
time of the summary judgment motions, over two years 
after the action was commenced.  Plaintiff’s Complaint 
only contains counts for professional negligence (Count 
I), breach of contract (Count II), and punitive damages 
(Count III).  Having been unable to produce any 
evidence to establish proximate cause or damages, 
plaintiff’s attempt to seek recovery on a theory not alleged 
in its Complaint was untimely, and should not have been 
considered.  Obviously, however, the trial court’s error in 
considering the untimely breach of fiduciary duty claim 
was harmless in light of its decision on the merits.37 
The court of appeals identified two issues in the appeal: 
whether the district court correctly granted summary judgment on 
(1) Padco’s legal malpractice claims and (2) Padco’s breach of 
fiduciary duty claims.38  To begin its discussion of the fiduciary duty 
issue, the court noted that “[t]he parties disagree on whether the 
complaint includes a claim for breach of fiduciary duty.”39  The 
court then addressed the respondents’ footnoted argument that 
the claim was not adequately pled.40  The court of appeals resolved 
the issue in a single paragraph, but with language that has proved 
fertile material for misinterpretation.  The court wrote: 
 
 
 34. Brief of Respondent at 14, Padco, 444 N.W. 889 (No. CT 86-11447). 
 35. Id. at 15. 
 36. Id. at 14 n.3. 
 37. Id.  
 38. Padco, 444 N.W.2d at 890. 
 39. Id. at 891. 
 40. Id. 
7
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The complaint contains three counts, separately labeled 
as “Professional Negligence,” “Breach of Contract,” and 
“Punitive Damages.”  The negligence count alleges the 
same elements which would be required for a claim of 
breach of fiduciary duty.  A specific legal theory does not 
need to be stated if the pleadings contain factual notice of 
the claim and a request for relief.  Under these 
circumstances, the complaint sufficiently alleges a claim 
for breach of fiduciary duty.41 
With that paragraph, the court of appeals held that Padco’s 
complaint sufficiently pled a breach of fiduciary duty claim, even 
though no such claim was expressly identified in the complaint.42  
The analysis and conclusion more or less reiterated the district 
court’s determination, adding supporting legal authority for the 
proposition that claims may be included in a complaint despite not 
being expressly identified.43  In the remainder of the opinion, the 
court proceeded to address the substance of the claim, and 
concluded by determining that Padco failed to allege any fact that 
would constitute a breach.44 
One sentence in that paragraph has inspired the pernicious 
error at this article’s focus.  The court’s statement that “[t]he 
negligence count alleges the same elements which would be 
required for a claim of breach of fiduciary duty”45 is the culprit—a 
source of confusion that has confounded litigants and courts in the 
years since Padco was decided. 
To illustrate that Padco has been misunderstood, and that it 
did not state or imply that negligence and fiduciary duty claims 
have the same elements, it is useful to highlight what else the case 
said and did not say about claims for breach of fiduciary duty.  The 
Padco court unequivocally acknowledged the Minnesota Supreme 
Court precedents cited in the appellant’s brief.46  The court of 
appeals wrote that under Minnesota law,  
 
 
 
 41. Id. (citations omitted). 
 42. See id. 
 43. Compare id., with Order and Memorandum, supra note 19, at 5. 
 44. Padco, 444 N.W.2d at 891–92.  This constituted a near-agreement with the 
district court, which determined that Padco failed to provide evidence to support a 
finding of breach.  See Order and Memorandum, supra note 19, at 6. 
 45. Padco, 444 N.W.2d at 891. 
 46. See id. 
8
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 [o]nce an attorney’s breach of fiduciary duty is 
established, the attorney clearly forfeits his right to 
compensation for his services if the case involves actual 
fraud or bad faith.  In cases where there is no actual fraud 
or bad faith, where there is no actual harm to the client, and 
where the breach involves “multiple potential plaintiffs,” 
the fee forfeiture may be scaled to the degree of 
misconduct by consideration of the factors enumerated in 
the punitive damages statute, Minn. Stat. § 549.20, subd. 3 
(1988).47 
The Padco court therefore recognized that a party may recover 
for a breach of fiduciary duty that did not cause harm, and 
impliedly recognized that the only essential elements of a claim are 
duty and breach. 
Padco should also be recognized for what it did not say: the 
opinion failed to decide the fiduciary duty issue by concluding 
Padco provided no evidence that the alleged breach caused harm.48  
The court’s analysis was divided into two numbered sections: 
section I, addressing Padco’s claim for professional negligence, and 
section II, dealing with the claim for breach of fiduciary duty.49  
Section I concluded when the court affirmed the district court’s 
grant of summary judgment on the negligence claim, on the basis 
that Padco failed to prove that the defendants’ negligence 
proximately caused damage.50  The court had a clear opportunity to 
decide the fiduciary duty issue on the same basis and conclude the 
opinion without further discussion.51  The omission makes perfect 
sense in light of the court’s recognition that a plaintiff with a 
fiduciary duty claim can recover even “where there is no actual 
harm.”  Having correctly recognized that Minnesota law does not 
require causation of damages as a necessary element in a claim for 
breach of fiduciary duty, the court addressed the fiduciary duty 
issue separately. 
 
 47. Padco, 444 N.W.2d at 891 (emphasis added) (citing for support Gilchrist 
v. Perl, 387 N.W.2d 412, 417 (Minn. 1986)). 
 48. See id. at 891–92. 
 49. Id. at 890–91. 
 50. Id. at 891. 
 51. Padco’s fiduciary duty claim was premised entirely on the facts it alleged 
to establish its claim for negligence.  Id.; Order & Memorandum, supra note 19, at 
5.  Assuming arguendo that a breach of fiduciary duty claim has the same essential 
elements as a negligence claim, then the fate of the fiduciary duty claim should 
have been determined by the same lack of damages evidence that defeated 
Padco’s negligence claim. 
9
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As is hopefully clear at this point, the court of appeals was not 
directly asked in Padco to decide the essential elements of a claim 
for breach of fiduciary duty.  And in no way do the analysis or 
conclusions in Padco support a conclusion that the essential 
elements of negligence and breach of fiduciary duty are the same.  
The Padco court was asked to decide whether a plaintiff’s claim had 
sufficiently stated a cause of action, which the court decided in the 
affirmative by concluding that the facts alleged in the complaint 
were sufficient to sustain the claim.  In doing so, it stated that 
“[t]he negligence count alleges the same elements which would be 
required for a claim of breach of fiduciary duty.”52  That is, in the 
complaint filed by Padco, the count identified as a negligence 
count specifically alleged facts sufficient to sustain a claim for 
fiduciary duty.  The court of appeals was not making a statement 
about negligence claims, generally; it was making a statement about 
the specific negligence count (and the facts incorporated therein) 
in Padco’s complaint.  Nor was the court of appeals making a 
statement of law about the elements of fiduciary duty breach 
claims, except to say that whatever the essential elements are, they 
were present in Padco’s complaint. 
Put another way, it would be correct to infer from Padco that a 
claim for professional negligence against an attorney necessarily 
includes a distinct claim for breach of fiduciary duty—the 
allegations necessary to state the first claim will generally include 
allegations sufficient to sustain the second.53  But it is invalid to 
conclude based on Padco that the cause of action known as breach 
of fiduciary duty and the cause of action for negligence bear 
identical essential elements.  Not only does Padco not say such a 
thing—it recognized the contrary!  The Padco court recognized that 
a claim for breach of fiduciary duty could be sustained even in the 
absence of harm to the plaintiff.54  The court’s troublesome 
statement that Padco’s “negligence count alleges the same 
elements” means only that the factual allegations necessary to 
sustain a fiduciary duty claim were a subset of the facts Padco 
 
 52. Padco, 444 N.W.2d at 891. 
 53. Or, as the district court’s summary judgment decision in Padco more 
eloquently explained, “[a]n essential element of any negligence claim is that 
plaintiff must prove that defendant owes him a duty.  It is axiomatic that in an 
attorney malpractice case the duty required is that of a fiduciary nature.”  Order 
and Memorandum, supra note 19, at 5. 
 54. Padco, 444 N.W.2d at 891. 
10
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alleged to support its professional negligence claim.55 
IV. THE ESSENTIAL ELEMENTS OF A BREACH OF FIDUCIARY 
DUTY CLAIM IN MINNESOTA ARE DUTY AND BREACH 
As explained above, harm caused by a defendant is not a 
necessary element of a breach of fiduciary duty claim.56  If a 
claimant establishes the existence of a fiduciary relationship and 
the breach of a duty arising from that relationship, then harm is 
implied by the breaching party’s violation of trust and loyalty.57  
Consequently, there are only two essential elements of a claim for 
breach of fiduciary duty in Minnesota: duty and breach.58 
Fiduciary duties arise when two parties are in a fiduciary 
relationship.59  Once a fiduciary relationship is established, a variety 
of fiduciary duties arise, generally including duties of loyalty and 
fidelity.60  It may be that a party seeking only to recover 
compensatory damages from a wayward fiduciary may need to 
establish that a breach caused the damages.61  But because 
compensation is not the only viable theory of recovery for a 
fiduciary duty claim, and because a party may recover without 
having been harmed at all,62 neither damages nor causation of 
 
 55. Id.  The beginning of the troublesome sentence would be more accurately 
phrased as “[Plaintiff’s] negligence count alleges . . . .” than its current form. 
 56. Commercial Assocs., Inc. v. Work Connection, Inc., 712 N.W.2d 772, at 
778 (Minn. Ct. App. 2006) (citing Perl v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 345 
N.W.2d 209 (Minn. 1984)); see also Hafemeister & Bryan, supra note 13, at 524 
n.195 (2009). 
 57. See St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 345 N.W.2d at 212–13. 
 58. See id.; see also Swenson v. Bender, 764 N.W.2d 596, 601 (Minn. Ct. App. 
2009). 
 59. Swenson, 764 N.W.2d at 601 (“Fiduciary relationships arise when one 
person trusts and confides in another who has superior knowledge and 
authority.”) (citing Carlson v. SALA Architects, Inc., 732 N.W.2d 324, 330 (Minn. 
Ct. App. 2007).  “A ‘fiduciary’ is ‘[a] person who is required to act for the benefit 
of another person on all matters within the scope of their relationship.”  Id. (citing 
BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 658 (8th ed. 2004)). 
 60. Id.; Commercial Assocs., 712 N.W.2d at 779. 
 61. See Herrmann v. McMenomy & Severson, 583 N.W.2d 283, 287–88, 288 
n.5 (Minn. Ct. App. 1998) (discussing a professional negligence claim), rev’d on 
other grounds, 590 N.W.2d 641 (Minn. 1999).  Herrmann is another decision by the 
Minnesota Court of Appeals with language that could be construed to conflate 
causes of action premised on negligence and fiduciary duty. 
 62. See St. Paul Fire & Marine, 345 N.W.2d at 212 (providing that 
disgorgement is available in lieu of nominal damages); Commercial Assocs., 712 
N.W.2d at 778 (recognizing same). 
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damages are essential elements of a breach of fiduciary duty claim.63 
It is significant that the court of appeals cases construing Padco 
to stand for the contrary proposition are unpublished; the errant 
construction of the case has not become binding precedent.64  No 
published court of appeals opinion has yet embraced the same 
reasoning, and the binding case law on the issue unequivocally 
refutes the notion that the elements of fiduciary duty and 
negligence claims are identical.65  But the persuasive nature of this 
series of unpublished court of appeals opinions has undoubtedly 
affected claimants at the trial and appellate levels in the state of 
Minnesota, and possibly more often and more significantly than on 
occasions identified in this article.  Despite the established case law 
set forth in the Minnesota Supreme Court’s Perl66 cases, and 
discussed in great length in court of appeals cases like Commercial 
Associates,67 the misapplication of Padco continues to recur.68  It may 
take an express, published disapproval released by one of 
Minnesota’s appellate courts to extinguish the error once and for 
all.  It seems almost inevitable that the court of appeals will again 
be invited by a party resisting a fiduciary breach claim to 
misconstrue Padco, and on that occasion, the court can right the 
course of Minnesota’s fiduciary duty law by expressly declining the 
invitation. 
 
 
 63. The fiduciary duty cause of action is not unique for its lack of harm and 
causation elements.  Damage is not a necessary element for a cause of action that 
supports an award of nominal damages, like trespass.  See Wendinger v. Forst 
Farms, Inc., 662 N.W.2d 546, 550 (Minn. Ct. App. 2003) (noting that a cause of 
action for trespass requires only two elements: possession and unlawful entry); 
Lake Mille Lacs Inv., Inc. v. Payne, 401 N.W.2d 387, 391 (Minn. Ct. App. 1987) 
(stating that a party having established a trespass is entitled to nominal damages).  
The trespass action may provide a closer analogy for the elements of a fiduciary 
duty claim than the negligence action—both require two elements, if the elements 
are proven, harm is implied, and proof of compensable damages is optional rather 
than necessary. 
 64. See MINN. STAT. § 480A.08, subdiv. 3(a–c) (2008). 
 65. Commercial Assocs., 712 N.W.2d at 778 (citing St. Paul Fire & Marine, 345 
N.W.2d 209). 
 66. Gilchrist v. Perl, 387 N.W.2d 412 (Minn. 1986); Rice v. Perl, 320 N.W.2d 
407 (Minn. 1982); St. Paul Fire & Marine, 345 N.W.2d 209. 
 67.  Commercial Assocs., 712 N.W.2d at 778. 
 68.  See, e.g., cases cited supra note 2; c.f. Defendant’s Letter Requesting 
Reconsideration from Terrance Flemming to Judge Porter, Carlson v. Lindquist & 
Vennum, No. 27-CV-09-20302 (Minn. 4th D. Apr. 6, 2010) (citing unpublished 
court of appeals opinions that rely on Padco for the proposition that negligence 
and fiduciary duty claims have the same elements) (on file with author). 
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